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I undertook to review this book about a year ago, and I have regretted it,
and put the job off, ever since. It is not that it makes difficult or tedious read-
ing; far from it. My Life in Court deserves its place at the top of the nonfiction
best sellers, for Mr. Nizer really has played a major r6le in some of the most
diverting litigation of our times; he seems to have almost total recall (and,
no doubt, excellent files) ; and the good stories lose nothing in his telling of
them. As bedside reading for lawyers and laymen, he is hard to beat.
Part of the inordinate delay is attributable to the mere length of the book;
no legal career below the level of Marshall's or Holmes' really deserves what
must be well over a quarter million words. But most of my procrastination was
because I found it prudent, even essential, to take Mr. Nizer's memoirs in
small, well-spaced doses. Hero-worship tends to cloy, and hero-worship,
amounting to uncritical adulation, is what Mr. Nizer plainly feels for the sub-
ject of his autobiography. Some such weakness was probably unavoidable; had
he suffered from modesty or shyness, his career would never have furnished
the raw material for a book like this one. A first-rate trial lawyer who hated
himself would be a lusus naturae as astounding and improbable as a diffident,
shrinking actor. But the art of self-praise is one whose extreme difficulty is
insufficiently appreciated by most of its numerous practitioners. It is true, as
Samuel Butler astutely remarked, that "the advantage of doing one's praising
for oneself is that one can lay it on so thick, and exactly in the right places."
Great as is this advantage, however, the compensating risk is even greater. To
avoid overdoing it, or to achieve the coup de maitre of letting one's light shine
freely while seeming modestly to place it under a bushel, requires skill of a
superlatively high order-a skill denied even to such consummate masters
of self-laudation as Marcus Cicero and Bernard Shaw. Indeed, the only ex-
ample which comes readily to mind of self-glorification which does not fatigue
the reader, because it is done with a masterly appearance of objectivity and
impartiality, is Julius Caesar. Mr. Nizer is not among the select company of
subtle masters of the art and mystery of the higher egotism. The tone of the
work is set by the dust jacket and end papers, which feature no less than six
different pictures of the author in various forensic poses, every one of them
dignified, intellectual, and impressive. The "I" count is also very high: on
a couple of pages selected by opening the book at random,' I find no less than
twenty-four first person pronouns. I assume that Mr. Nizer must have lost a
case at some time since he took to the law; it is even possible that he has been
outfoxed by an opponent. But no hint of any such contretemps appears in these
pages. By the same token, I assume that he did not fight every battle alone; but
I cannot recall any place in which he mentions the name of a partner or asso-
ciate.
Nevertheless, Mr. Nizer's chapters are highly enjoyable and in places in-




the record shows, almost as good as he thinks he is. As an office lawyer-by
which I mean one whose practice consists largely of divining the law and
applying it to his clients' problems-he appears to be reasonably competent.
But his talents in this end of the business are by no means as spectacular as a
lay reader might suppose after perusing, for example, his stream-of-con-
sciousness account of his own legal reasoning on matters of corporation law
in the course of the great battle for control of Loew's.2 It is notorious that
great advocates are not necessarily, and perhaps not even usually, great lawyers
-Lord Erskine is one demonstration of that proposition, and Sir Edward
Marshall Hall another.8 It is safe to say that there are at least a thousand
lawyers on Manhattan Island, and not a few students in this and other law
schools, who could have done as well or better on these not very difficult
questions of corporation law.4 But there are not a dozen who could have matched
Nizer's performance, chronicled in the first chapter, in persuading a jury to
award Quentin Reynolds punitive damages of monstrous size in his libel suit
against Westbrook Pegler and the Hearst Corporations.5 That chapter makes
superb reading, in part, of course, because it is always pleasant to see the likes
of Pegler get their comeuppance, but largely because of the virtuosity of Mr.
Nizer's handling of the witnesses and jury. That virtuosity is demonstrated
again and again and in many contexts in the succeeding chapters, for Mr.
Nizer is a specialist only in the sense that he specializes in litigation. As a
litigator, he comes about as close as a lawyer can to being a general practi-
tioner, save that he seems to have avoided criminal cases, or at any rate in-
cludes none in these chronicles. Otherwise, as the present volume shows, all is
grist that comes to his mill--copyright, personal injury, malpractice, domestic
relations, savage corporate infighting, in and out of court.
Here, then, are a series of accounts of what are often termed, especially by
Mr. Nizer, courtroom dramas which are fascinating in their details and which
constitute, moreover, excellent clinical studies in trial practice, step-by-step
demonstrations by an undoubted master of the conception and execution of
some of his principal masterpieces. It is generally interesting, and even excit-
ing, to watch at work a master of any art, craft, or skill, however humble, even
2. See, e.g., pp. 466-69, 490-92.
3. See Lord Birkett's article on Erskine in The Listener, June 29, 1961, p. 1128; Kvrt-
joamAxEs, LI= oF SIR EDWARD MARSHALL HAL, K. C. (1929).
4. Mr. Nizer seems to lack that precision and attention to detail which usually are re-
garded as helpful, if not essential, in the practice of corporation law. For ex-ample, he states
that "The By-laws of the corporation provided for cumulative voting." Actually the provision
was located in Loew's certificate of incorporation, as, under Delaware law, it had to be. Dz.
CODE, Tit. 8, § 214 (1953) ; see Campell v. Loew's, Inc., 134 A.2d 852 (Del. CI. 1957).
5. The difference between Louis Nizer as a courtroom lawyer and Louis Nizer as an
office lawyer is further exemplified by a statement on page 151. 'What Reynolds had not
known was that compensatory damages are substitution for lost income and are taxable.
Punitive damages are not" We may hope and assume that Mr. Reynolds' tax returns are
prepared by somebody else, for Air. Nizer's proposition is not known to tax lawyers either.
See C. A. Hawkins, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927) ; Rev. Rul. 54-418, 1958-2 Cum. BuL. 18.
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yo-yo twirling or golf. I well remember, for instance, spending a long and bliss-
ful afternoon watching billiard balls, under the command of the late Willy
Hoppe, move through fantastically intricate evolutions with the snap and
precision of Kaiser Wilhelm's Prussian Guard. And yet Mr. Nizer's exhibition
of his skill, though dazzling, somehow failed to afford me that simple and
strong pleasure. After some cogitation, I have concluded that the trouble is
that a very great part of Mr. Nizer's art or craft is essentially meretricious.
This is not his fault, for he must work, and do the best he can for his clients,
within the system which exists. Nor can he reasonably be expected to sub-
ject that system to critical examination, any more than Mr. Vholes was likely
to deplore (even in his own mind) the Chancery practice of the time of Bleak
House, for he gets his bread and butter by it, with a heavy coat of jam. More-
over, very few of us are objective enough to ask if what we do with great
dexterity is really worth doing at all. Mr. Nizer, of course, is no Vholes, for
every page of his book shows that he is one of those lawyers who wholehearted-
ly (and warmheartedly) make their client's cause their own; his jubilation in
victory plainly reflects more than mere gratification at personal triumph.
Nevertheless, the total impression with which I am left is that Mr. Nizer is a
good man in a bad trade, or at least a trade which ought to be a great deal
better than it is.
The depressing fact is that My Life in Court seems to me to raise anew,
however unintentionally and even against interest, a suspicion that has been
gnawing at my vitals for years: to wit, that our ancient system of trial by
jury is in some contexts not merely ancient but antiquated, and that it stands
in need of some fundamental re-examination and maybe revision. I do not
suggest, of course, that the jury be abolished. Indeed, I think that in some
types of litigation-for instance, the ordinary personal injury action and
many or most criminal cases-the jury, though far from perfect, is still in all
probability the best available device for securing substantial justice. Moreover,
I am well aware that to a very numerous class of judges, lawyers, professors,
politicians, and plain citizens the jury is still a totem figure comparable to
Mother or Dwight D. Eisenhower. The orthodox appraisal of the jury system
is still probably represented by the famous dictum of Blackstone, recently
endorsed by Mr. Justice Black,0 that "the trial by jury ever has been, and I
trust ever will be, looked upon as the glory of the English law. And if it has
so great an advantage over others in regulating civil property, how much must
that advantage be heightened when it is applied to criminal cases I . .. [IIt is
the most transcendent privilege which any subject can enjoy, or wish for,
that he cannot be affected either in his property, his liberty, or his person, but
by the unanimous consent of twelve of his neighbors and equals." 7 In our
6. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 26-31 (1957). Mr. Justice Black's opinion, in which
the Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred, quotes or cites a number of
other tributes to the jury system by eminent authorities, none of which (except Ills own
opinion in Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955)) is very recent.
7. 3 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 379 (1829).
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time and place, this majestic rhetoric requires qualification in certain im-
portant areas. Try reading Blackstone to a Negro charged with raping a white
woman in Yahoo County, Mississippi, and see if he breaks into cheers. Black-
stone, of course, wrote in the light of the history he knew, and that history
gave some ground for the assumption, implicit in his encomium, that brave,
honest, and intelligent jurors might well interpose themselves between a sub-
ject and a tyrannical sovereign-at least where the tyrant's prejudices ran
counter to those of the mass of his subjects. He had in mind, no doubt, such
instances as the acquittal of the seven bishops whom James II had caused to
be tried for publishing a seditious libel.s But Blackstone and Black might have
recalled some defendants in the long and not always glorious history of the
common law up to Blackstone's own day who perhaps would not have thought
so very transcendent the privilege of entrusting their lives to twelve of their
neighbors and equals-for an obvious instance, the Roman Catholics whom
juries sent to the gallows on the evidence of Titus Oates and his coadjutors in
the invention of the Popish Plot.9
But whatever the truth of Blackstone's statement in the eighteenth century,
there are not many immutables in the common law, and it does not by any
means follow that because it was then true, or mainly true, that it ought to be
accepted unquestioningly and in all circumstances today. In fact, of course, it is
not unanimously accepted; perceptive judges and lawyers have long been
afflicted with a cankerous suspicion that the jury system, as presently consti-
tuted, may not be particularly well calculated to produce justice in eacry case
between man and man or man and sovereign-that it is sometimes, in short,
a sort of vermiform appendix in the body politic, like segregation or the
Congressional seniority system, whose malfunctioning may be the cause of ap-
palling bellyaches. Probably the most acute and reasoned criticism is that of
Jerome Frank,'0 but the most quotable is Mr. Dooley's: "Whin the case is all
over, the jury'll pitch th' tistimony out iv the window, an' consider three ques-
tions: 'Did Lootgert look as though he'd kill his wife? Did his wife look
as though she ought to be kilt? Isn't it time we wint to supper?' ,,' Without
attempting to recapitulate Judge Frank's detailed analysis, it is obvious that
there are some cases (antitrust litigation, for instance) in which it is virtually
impossible to find twelve laymen who, with the best will in the world, can
8. See II M.AcAuLAY, HI sToRY oF ENGL D cL. VIII, pp. 289-99 (1856). But the
currents of prejudice ran somewhat crooked even in that case, for one of the panel was
Michael Arnold, brewer to the court, who is supposed to have said, "Whatever I do, I am
sure to be half ruined. If I say Not Guilty, I shall brew no more for the King; and if I say
Guilty, I shall brew no more for anybody else." He very nearly succeeded in hanging the
jury. Id. at 292,298.
9. See I MAcAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND ch. II, pp. 181-85. "The juries partook of
the feelings then common throughout the nation, and were encouraged by the bench to in-
dulge those feelings without restraint."
10. See, e.g., FRAxx, CouRTs ox¢ TRaAL passim and especially cI. VIII (1949).
11. Dunn% Mr. Dooley on Expert Testimony, in Mip- Doom I nz WAR Aim Pfc
(1898).
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understand what the incredibly complicated and voluminous evidence is all
about, and others (civil rights cases, for example, in some of the states of the
late Confederacy) in which it is virtually impossible to find twelve jurors who
will let their verdict be influenced either by the evidence or the law. And there
are still other cases in which there is only too much reason to suspect em-
bracery.12 Even in run-of-the-mill cases, it is common knowledge that jurors
often find it easier to follow their prejudices than the evidence. It is instructive
to listen to an experienced trial lawyer dispense his ripe wisdom on the subject
of picking a jury. I once heard a very eminent criminal lawyer, since turned
hanging judge, discourse on his technique. What he wanted in a juror, of
course, was warmheartedness and sympathy, and so, since he happened to be
a Jew, he recommended Jewish jurors, though he also had a good word for
Italians. An equally eminent Irish lawyer spoke warmly in favor of Irishmen.
If he had been a Turk or a Cambodian he would have counselled the selection
of Turks or Cambodians. 13 The point is that few or none of them are interested
in picking a juror who will do even-handed justice, and all of them assume
that it is possible and desirable to pick jurors who will be suitably prejudiced.
It is nearly axiomatic that a lawyer who is sure his client is right on the facts
will do his best to get a trial before a judge, while a lawyer who knows his
client's evidence is weak will demand a jury. In the criminal area, it is hard
to say whether more harm is done by unjust convictions or unjust acquittals.
Perhaps the latter, for an appellate court can weed out the unjust convictions,
and there is a fair to good chance that it actually will do so. There is not much
in the argument that juries stand between the public and undue enforcement of
harsh or unpopular laws. Aside from the orthodox rejoinder (which, it must
be admitted, has more theoretical than practical force) that the best way to
get rid of such a statute is to enforce it strictly, there is the highly practical
consideration that most District Attorneys are hopeful politicians, and few of
them see much advantage in zealous enforcement of a statute which runs
counter to the mores of any considerable section of the electorate.
The principal alternative to trial by jury is trial by a judge, and it must, of
course, be conceded that judges are but men and not invariably very good men.
Since 1688, in the English speaking countries at least, we have seen no such
monstrous and terrible judge as Baron Jeffreys, but in very recent times there
have certainly been a few who in their small way were no roses. The late
junior Senator from Wisconsin, Joseph R. McCarthy, got his political start
as a trial judge, and a marvellously bad one at that.' 4 The successful ICu Ilux
12. For an entertaining, if unedifying, account of the jury trial and acquittal of a de-
fendant with almost unlimited wealth, see the account of the trial of Harry Sinclair in
WEINER AND STARRI, TEAror DOME, chs. 9 and 11 (1959).
13. It is a fact that I have yet to hear any criminal lawyer, even a Yankee criminal
lawyer, recommend that the jury be loaded with Yankees. Personally, I regard Yankees
as a very soft-hearted lot.
14. See State ex rel. Dep't of Agriculture v. McCarthy, 238 Wis. 258, 299 N.W. 258
(1941) ; The Judge on Trial, The Progressive, April, 1954, pp. 6-8.
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Klandidate for governor of Alabama, the honorable George C. Wallace,
is another example of a trial judge who seems a trifle lacking in what is usually
regarded as the judicial temperament. 15 I could probably think of other such
specimens, but not very many. Such judges are sufficiently rare so that their
antics attract attention, most of it unfavorable, which they would attract in no
other trade. Taking one day with another, the average judge has the intelli-
gence, experience, and abilitj needed to weigh the evidence in any case which
is likely to come before him, and almost always, however cantankerous he may
be, he can be counted on to make a sincere and generally successful effort to
put aside his own prejudices. Moreover, his decision can almost never be
bought for money, and usually (particularly in the case of federal judges) it
cannot be influenced by political pressure. In short, while the superiority of
judges to juries is far from clear-cut, and is probably nonexistent in many
kinds of trial, my own belief is that, in some situations, it might be useful to
reconsider the appropriateness of the popular assumption that jury trial
should always be available.
These skeptical (but not cynical) reflections are reinforced by perusing Mr.
Nizer's account of how to win cases and ingratiate oneself with juries. I hasten
to say that he does nothing in the least improper, nothing that his duty to his
client does not-under the present system-require him to do. According to the
law books, Mr. Nizer's job in the Reynolds case was to persuade the jury by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendants had falsely, and without a
privilege to do so, published matter defamatory to the plaintiff.'0 In reality,
what Mr. Nizer had to do was persuade the jurors that Reynolds was one of
nature's noblemen and Pegler a five-star stinker. The latter hardly required a
legal Hercules; it might have been done by a lawyer of quite ordinary talents,
although Mr. Nizer's pulverization of Pegler was certainly extraordinarily
thorough and satisfactory. But a great part of the strategy of counsel was de-
voted to problems which should not have mattered at all, and probably would
not have mattered if the case had been tried to a judge. For example-and
it is only one example-some of the jurors were Catholics, and it is obvious
that Mr. Nizer assumed that they might well vote for the side which most
gratified their religious sensibilities and against the side so unlucky or inept
as to offend those sensibilities.17 Pegler was a Catholic, but so was Reynolds,
and if "no one would have compared [Reynolds'] worldliness with the holy
dedication of priesthood,"':8 Pegler was also lacking in some of the attributes
of saintliness. So far, a draw, although apparently Mr. Nizer would have
despaired of justice had Reynolds been, say, a Seventh Day Adventist. But
Pegler's counsel calls a priest, one Father Braun, as a witness; Mr. Nizer is
"disturbed by such a display of clerical garb in front of the jury box." He
agonizes over the question whether to trump Pegler's priest with Bishop Sheen
15. He recently denounced the entire federal judiciary, en masse and without exception,
as "lousy and irresponsible." See Time, June 8, 1962, p. 25.
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-then only a Monsignor but already pretty well known-and finally decides
not to; neither does he cross-examine Father Braun, for that might mean "at-
tacking him and perhaps offending the sensitivity of some jurors."10 In fact,
neither Father Braun nor Monsignor Sheen had any evidence of importance,
and if the trier of the fact had been a judge, of whatever religious persuasion,
it is very unlikely that either side would have gone through any such charade.
There are other similar examples.
20
Not surprisingly, Mr. Nizer greatly prefers juries to judges. I probably
would too, if I were he. Not only does his trade, which is persuading juries that
his clients ought to win, keep him in considerable style, but it is obvious that
he hugely enjoys playing a succession of starring roles in courtroom dramas.
He says:
Although jurors are extraordinarily right in their conclusion, it is usually
based on common sense "instincts" about right and wrong, and not on
sophisticated evaluations of complicated testimony . ..Because judges,
sometimes, consciously reject this layman's approach of who is right or
wrong and restrict themselves to the precise legal weights, they come out
wrong more often than juries.21
This is a polite way to put it, and appealing too; but mnutatis mutandis, it
comes to pretty much the same thing as the dicta of Mr. Dooley and Jerome
Frank.22 It certainly does not justify every jury trial. I suggest that the reader
try applying Mr. Nizer's reference to the jury's "common sense 'instincts"
about right and wrong" to the Mississippi Negro charged with rape of a white
woman or the Mississippi Ku Kluxer charged with lynching that Negro, and
see how it sounds.
You can't blame a bartender, however, for not joining the Anti-Saloon
League, and the foregoing querulous comments are not just criticisms of Mr.
Nizer's book. Our jury system is with us, and probably will be for some time
to come-and one virtue it certainly has. It often produces wonderful reading
matter. When lawyers are arguing to a court, the record, as the learned readers
of this Journal well know, usually makes dry and indigestible reading. And
that is a charge which neither judge nor jury would ever sustain against
My Life in Court.
JosEPH W. Bisuo,, JR.t
19. P. 125.
20. E.g., pp. 393-95. This one involved Lutheran pastors, testifying to the value of an
advertising man negligently killed by the Long Island Railroad.
21. P. 313.
22. The jury are more brutally direct. They determine that they want Jones to collect
$5,000 from the railroad company, or that they don't want pretty Nellie Brown to
go to jail for killing her husband; and they bring in their general verdict accordingly.
Often, to all practical intents and purposes, the judge's statement of the legal rules
might just as well never have been expressed.
FRANiK, op. cit. supra note 10, at 111.
tProfessor of Law, Yale Law School.
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